Individuals vulnerable to obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) are hypothesized to have ambivalence about their selfworth, morality and lovability [Guidano, V., & Liotti, G. (1983) . Cognitive processes and emotional disorders. New York:
Introduction
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is characterized by two central phenomena: obsessions and compulsions. Obsessions are persistent ideas, thoughts, impulses or images that are experienced as intrusive and inappropriate and that cause marked anxiety or distress (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) . Compulsions are repetitive behaviours or mental acts that are performed to prevent or reduce anxiety or distress (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) . With an estimated lifetime prevalence of between 1.6% (Kessler, Berglund, Demler, Jin, & Walters, 2005) and 2.5% (Karno, Golding, Sorenson, & Burnam, 1988) , OCD is one of the most common psychiatric disorders (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992) . OCD is associated with high degrees of psychiatric co-morbidity especially with mood disorders and other anxiety disorders (Sobin et al., 1999) , and is considered one of the most disabling disorders (World Health Organisation, 1996) .
Once considered refractory to psychological treatments, OCD is now considered responsive to a range of interventions such as exposure and response prevention therapy (Foa et al., 2005) and reappraisal techniques (Abramowitz, Brigidi, & Roche, 2001 ) both of which are grounded in a cognitive-behavioural understanding of the disorder (Franklin & Foa, 1998) . Drawing on research findings that negative intrusions are experienced by most individuals (reviewed in Gibbs, 1996) , proponents of the cognitive-behavioural perspective propose that whether or not the intrusion escalates into a clinical obsession and provokes compulsions depends on the way the person appraises the intrusion (Rachman, 1997; Salkovskis, 1985) . For example, Salkovskis (1985) suggests that a thought has the potential to become distressing and obsessional if it is interpreted as implying high personal responsibility. According to Salkovskis, if individuals believe that they are responsible for preventing harmful consequences related to having the thought, they are likely to ruminate about the thought, and engage in compulsions or other behaviour in order to suppress the thought, and to avoid harmful outcomes. In cognitive-behavioural models of OCD, specific dysfunctional belief dimensions or domains are thought to drive the negative appraisal of intrusive thoughts (Frost & Steketee, 2002) . Six types of belief domains have been implicated as vulnerability for OCD: an inflated sense of personal responsibility, an overestimation of the likelihood of threat, an intolerance of uncertainty, perfectionism, beliefs about the negative meanings of thoughts and beliefs about the necessity to control negative thoughts (ObsessiveCompulsive Cognitions Working Group, 1997) .
Recently, some authors have focused on the significance of self-perceptions for the development of obsessions and compulsions (reviewed in Doron & Kyrios, 2005) . For example, Rachman (1997 Rachman ( , 1998 has argued that catastrophic misinterpretations of the personal significance of intrusions contribute to the development and maintenance of obsessions. According to Rachman, repugnant intrusive thoughts can become the focus of obsessional rumination when they are interpreted as revealing important but usually hidden elements in the individual's character such as that one is evil, dangerous, unreliable or potentially uncontrollable. For Rachman, individuals who interpret abhorrent intrusive thoughts as personally significant, reinforce the strength and importance of the thoughts, because they place excessive amounts of attention on such thoughts. Compulsions and other avoidance behaviours emerge as strategies to prevent the expression of feared aspect of self and to restore positive representations of self.
Purdon and associates (Purdon & Clark, 1999; Rowa & Purdon, 2003; Rowa, Purdon, Summerfeldt, & Antony, 2005) have also suggested that judgements about whether mental intrusions contradict and threaten valued aspects of self is relevant to the escalation of certain intrusive thoughts into obsessions. In two studies, Rowa and associates (Rowa & Purdon, 2003; Rowa et al., 2005) found that that distress about unwanted thoughts was related to the extent to which those thoughts contradicted one's valued self-perceptions. Likewise, Ferrier and Brewin (2005) found that individuals with OCD drew significantly more negative inferences about themselves from their intrusions than did a group of anxiety controls. Individuals with OCD were more likely to perceive themselves as dangerous to self or others as a result of intrusions. Ferrier and Brewin conclude that their findings ''concur with Rachman's (1997) proposal that obsessions are viewed by individuals with OCD as revealing important but hidden elements to identity'' (p. 1371).
However, little is understood about why individuals with OCD make such negative self-judgments when they experience mental intrusions that contradict some valued aspects of their self-concept. Social psychological research shows that people tend to reject self-incriminating information in order to protect a positive sense of self-worth (reviewed in Sherman & Cohen, 2002) . Such research shows that when confronted with information that threatens self-worth, people dismiss or distort the information in order to sustain their feelings of adaptiveness and integrity. In contrast, when faced with threatening information about self (e.g., having intrusive thoughts about causing harm to someone else), individuals with OCD appear to revise their self-image in accordance with these intrusions (Ferrier & Brewin, 2005) . Instead of dismissing the importance of such intrusions and thereby protecting self-esteem, individuals with OCD appear to exaggerate the importance of these negative intrusions for their sense of identity (Ferrier & Brewin, 2005) , moral integrity (Shafran, Thordarson, & Rachman, 1996) and culpability for harm (Wroe & Salkovskis, 2000) . Why individuals with OCD interpret these intrusions as meaningful signifiers of self requires further examination.
Some authors have suggested that individuals with OCD are highly ambivalent about personal characteristics and therefore, these individuals perceive negative mental intrusions as evidence of internal failings (Guidano, 1987; Guidano & Liotti, 1983; Rachman & Hodgson, 1980) . Guidano and Liotti describe such self-ambivalence as the presence of conflicting beliefs about self characteristics (e.g., I am moral and I am immoral), uncertainty about self-worth, and a preoccupation with establishing the ''truth'' about one's moral standing, lovability and self-worth. Guidano and Liotti argue that individuals prone to obsessionality (including OCD phenomena and obsessive compulsive personality traits) have highly ambivalent beliefs about their self-worth, and in particular about their moral virtue and lovability. Guidano and Liotti (1983) propose that self-ambivalence constitutes a predisposition towards considering ego-dystonic intrusions as threats to a valued definition of self. The increased attention given to the intrusion is purported to play a significant role in exacerbating the frequency and persistence of the intrusion. For Guidano and Liotti (1983) , intrusive thoughts become repetitive and distressing-that is obsessions-because they activate one's latent ambivalence about whether one is maintaining moral purity and social approval. Conversely, compulsions and other neutralization strategies emerge as solutions for resolving self-ambivalence and reinstating the ideal-self. Similar to Rachman's (1997 Rachman's ( , 1998 ) model of OCD, Guidano and Liotti present compulsions as mechanisms for recommitting to moral and social ideals. For example, within their model of OCD, the individual engages in checking compulsions not only to avert danger, but also to avoid negative selfperceptions as someone who is immoral or socially reprehensible. According to this perspective, compulsions function to align the self-concept with images of self that are valued and idealized by the individual.
The presence of self-ambivalence can also explain why individuals with OCD subscribe to beliefs about the need to maintain high standards of conduct (perfectionism), responsibility and control of thoughts. The belief domains associated with OCD may work as a 'protective belt' (Guidano & Liotti, 1983, p. 267) , that is, as compensatory strategies to establish that the self is worthwhile, moral and lovable. By maintaining perfectionist standards, stringent responsibility and rigid control over thoughts, the individual with OCD purportedly strives to avoid self or social condemnation. Self-ambivalence is thus positioned by Guidano and Liotti as a meta-vulnerability for OCD. Its presence provides a rationale for the emergence and maintenance not only of OCD symptoms but also OCD-relevant dysfunctional beliefs.
There is some evidence that supports the involvement of uncertain and insecure appraisals about self in OCD. Ferrier and Brewin (2005) found that individuals with OCD have salient notions of feared selfcharacteristics involving dangerousness and immorality to a greater extent than anxious controls, suggesting an association between conflicts about one's personal characteristics and OCD. Further, Ruegg (1994) found that patients with OCD were more indecisive about their present personal characteristics compared to normal controls. This finding suggests that individuals with OCD have more ambiguously defined self-beliefs than non-clinical controls. With low self-esteem and uncertainty about self found to be closely related (Campbell, 1990) , negative correlations between measures of OCD symptoms and self-esteem after controlling for depression and anxiety reported by Ehntholt, Salkovskis, and Rimes (1999) indirectly alludes to an association between low certainty about self-worth and OCD symptoms. Finally, Doron, Kyrios, and Moulding (in press) found that individuals who valued being moral, scholarly and socially acceptable but who felt incompetent in these areas showed high levels of OCD phenomena and OCD-relevant dysfunctional beliefs.
Research has not, however, examined the extent to which self-ambivalence, as defined by Guidano and Liotti (1983) relates to OCD phenomena or to the various OCD-relevant dysfunctional beliefs. For example, research has yet to examine the basic hypothesis that an operational measure of self-ambivalence will correlate with measures of OCD phenomena and OCD-relevant dysfunctional beliefs. Likewise, there have been no studies examining whether individuals with OCD are more ambivalent about their self-worth, compared to non-clinical individuals.
The question of whether self-ambivalence is specific to OCD has also yet to be examined. Unstable and uncertain views of self have been implicated in general in a range of anxiety and mood disorders. For example, Clark and Wells (1995) suggest that individuals with social anxiety have extremely uncertain views of themselves, and therefore base their sense of self-worth on the reactions of other people. Other authors suggest that patients with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) experience considerable distress because of irreconcilable images of self before and after trauma (March, 1990) . Having unstable beliefs about one's attributes, values and goals has also been implicated as vulnerability for depressive symptoms and low selfesteem (reviewed in Campbell & Lavallee, 1993; Gould, Prentice, & Ainslie, 1996; Strauman & Kolden, 1997) . No research has investigated whether individuals with OCD have higher levels of self-ambivalence than those with other anxiety disorders. Research has also not examined whether self-ambivalence relates to OCD when controlling for associated factors such as self-esteem and negative mood states.
The purpose of this study was to examine the relationships of self-ambivalence to OCD phenomena and OCD-relevant dysfunctional beliefs. A measure of self-ambivalence was developed in order to examine these relationships. High scores on this measure of self-ambivalence were expected to be associated with high scores on measures of OCD severity and OCD-relevant dysfunctional beliefs. We also examined whether these relationships remained significant after controlling for the effects of anxiety, depression and self-esteem. Given that individuals without OCD also demonstrate OCD phenomena (Gibbs, 1996) , these questions was explored in a mixed sample of non-clinical participants, anxiety disorder patients without OCD, as well as patients with OCD. Patients with OCD were hypothesized to report higher levels of self-ambivalence than non-clinical controls. The extent to which self-ambivalence was higher in patients with OCD compared to those with other anxiety disorders was also investigated.
Method

Participants
Participants included 73 individuals diagnosed with OCD, 50 individuals diagnosed with another anxiety disorder, 225 non-clinical student controls and 43 non-clinical participants from the general community. Exclusion criteria for the clinical samples were the presence of a substance related disorder, psychotic disorder or neurological dysfunction. DSM-IV diagnoses for the OCD and anxious control samples were established with the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule for DSM-IV (Brown, Di Nardo, & Barlow, 1994) . As shown in Table 1 , (a) the community control cohort was older than the other groups, while the student control cohort constituted the youngest group, (b) community controls reported most years of education compared with the other groups, while the OCD sample reported the least years of education and (c) a majority of participants were female, Australian born and spoke only English at home.
The most common co-morbid diagnoses in the OCD sample was major depressive disorder, dysthymic disorder (4.11%) and social phobia (4.11%). The anxious controls had the following diagnoses: Social phobia (28%), Panic disorder (28%), Generalized anxiety disorder (18%), PTSD (12%), Specific phobia (8%), and Anxiety disorder not otherwise specified (6%). Of the anxious controls, 24% were diagnosed with comorbid major depressive disorder, and 16% met criteria for dysthymic disorder. The student controls comprised psychology undergraduate volunteers receiving course credit for participation in the study. The other participants were recruited from the University of Melbourne Psychology Clinic, through advertisements in local newspapers, local anxiety disorder support groups, leaflets at public venues such as libraries and community sport centres, and personal contacts of the researchers.
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Procedure
Approval for recruitment was gained from the University of Melbourne Human Research Ethics Committee and in the case of OCD participants from the Melbourne Health Behavioural and Psychiatric Research Ethics Committee. All participants provided consent for participating. Student controls completed an assessment battery in class room conditions, while community controls were mailed a battery of questionnaires with a reply paid envelope. The anxious controls and OCD patients attended an assessment session, which included a diagnostic interview and questionnaires. Following the completion of the assessment, participants were provided with a written explanation of the aims of the study. A subset of the OCD sample (n ¼ 43; mean age ¼ 36.78; SD ¼ 11.49; % females ¼ 58.14) who were on a waiting list for treatment completed the measure of self-ambivalence before and after an average of 10.8 weeks, yielding data on the temporal stability of the measure.
Measures
The Padua Inventory-Washington State University Revision (PI) (Burns, Keortge, Formea, & Sternberger, 1996 ) is a 39-item self-report scale that measures the degree of distress caused by a range of intrusive thoughts and compulsive behaviours, on a 5-point scale (0, not at all to 4, very much). The PI comprises five subscales: obsessions of harm, aggressive impulses, contamination obsessions and washing compulsions, checking compulsions, and grooming behaviours (Burns et al., 1996) . The PI demonstrates good internal consistency (Cronbach alphas (a) for the subscales range from .77 to .88) and discriminant validity with respect to measures of worry and anxiety (Burns et al., 1996) . This inventory was used to assess the severity of OCD phenomena in this study.
The Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire-44 (OBQ-44) (Obsessive-Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 2005) consists of 44 belief statements considered characteristic dysfunctional beliefs of OCD sufferers. The OBQ-44 contains three subscales: (a) Inflated responsibility and overestimation of threat (''Responsibility''), (b) over-importance and over-control of thoughts (''Importance of thoughts'') and (c) perfectionism and intolerance of uncertainty (''Perfectionism''). Respondents rate the extent to which they agree with each item, using a 7-point rating scale from ''strongly disagree'' (1) to ''agree very much'' (7). The OBQ-44 has been shown to perform well on tests of internal consistency (a for the subscales range from .89 to .95), and criterion related validity in clinical and non-clinical samples (Obsessive-Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 2005 ). In the current study, this questionnaire was used as a measure of OCD-relevant dysfunctional beliefs.
The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Questionnaire (RSE) (Rosenberg, 1965) was used as a measure of global selfesteem. The RSE comprises 10 statements regarding feelings of self-acceptance, self-respect and self-worth. Respondents rate each item on a 9-point scale (1, ''definitely disagree''; 9, ''definitely agree''). The RSE is unifactorial (Greenberger, Chen, Dmitrieva, & Farruggia, 2003) and has acceptable reliability (a ¼ .88, test-retest correlations over a week ¼ .82: Gray-Little, Williams, & Hancock, 1997) . Construct validity of the scale has been demonstrated by its convergence with measures of depression, anxiety, self-discrepancy and other measures of self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1979) .
Negative mood states were measured by the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI) (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) and Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) (Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988; Beck & Steer, 1990) . The BDI and BAI are 21-item self-report instruments measuring the severity of depression and anxiety, respectively. Each item is rated on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 to 3 and possible scores range from 0 to 63. Support for the BDI and BAIs validity and reliability is well established with samples from various populations (reviewed in Beck & Steer, 1990; Beck et al., 1996) . For example, the internal consistency alpha for the BDI was found to be .92 for outpatients and .93 for undergraduate university students, and patients with mood disorders obtained higher scores on the BDI than patients with other diagnoses (Beck et al., 1996) .
The Self-Ambivalence Measure (SAM) was developed for this study as an operational measure of Guidano and Liotti's concept of self-ambivalence. Twenty-one items were initially generated based on several sources, including the theoretical model of Guidano and Liotti (Guidano, 1987; Guidano & Liotti, 1983) , clinical information from OCD patients, and consultations with clinicians familiar with Guidano and Liotti's framework (G. Bates, personal communication, April 20, 1998; A. Piccardi, personal communication, May 21, 1999 ). Items represented ambivalence about self-worth (e.g., ''I feel I am full of contradictions''), morality (e.g., ''I question whether I am a moral person'') and social acceptance (e.g., ''I doubt whether others really like me''). Further, each domain of ambivalence was represented by items measuring self-uncertainty (e.g., ''I have mixed feelings about my self-worth''), dichotomous appraisals about self (e.g., ''I question whether I am morally a good or bad person''), and preoccupation about self-worth (e.g., ''I think about my worth as a person''). Respondents rated each item on a 5-point scale (0, not at all to 4, agree totally). The factor structure and psychometric properties of SAM are outlined briefly below. For details about the development of the SAM, see Bhar (2004) .
The 21 items were subjected to principal axis factor analysis. Exploratory rather than confirmatory factor analysis was employed to avoid restricting the factor structure to a priori expectations (Thompson, 2004) . Consistent with the prediction that the factors would be correlated, promax rotation method was used. The factor structure was developed using the 268 non-clinical participants, and then validated with 123 clinical participants. (Zwick & Velicer, 1986 ) indicated a two factor solution for the non-clinical sample. The eigenvalues for the first and second factors were 8.29 and 1.60, and together, accounted for 38.78% of the variance. An item was included in a factor scale if the item's loading was at least .30 and if the difference in its loadings across factors was more than .10. Nineteen items showed this loading pattern (see Appendix). A second factor analysis was subsequently conducted on the clinical sample, using the same extraction and rotation method. Based on scree plot and parallel analysis indications, two factors comprised the most appropriate solution. The eigenvalues for the first and second factors were 8.49 and 1.84, respectively, and together these factors accounted for 49.18% of the variance. Although items 1, 5, and 9 loaded on different factors across the samples, Cattell's saliency index (s-index) analysis approached unity (s ¼ .92, po.01) indicating there was significant invariance of factors between the non-clinical and clinical solutions (Cattell, Balcar, Horn, & Nesselroade, 1969) . Therefore, the factor structure using the larger non-clinical sample was retained. Two subscales were developed: self-ambivalence about self-worth (self-worth ambivalence (SA); 13 items, e.g., ''I feel torn between different parts of my personality'') and ambivalence about morality (moral ambivalence (MA); six items, e.g., ''I question whether I am a moral person''). Correlations between the subscales was high in the non-clinical sample (r ¼ .69, po.001) and clinical sample (r ¼ .76, po.001).
Reliability and convergent validity of SAM were acceptable. Internal consistency of the SAM subscales were high in the non-clinical sample (SA: a ¼ .88, mean item-total correlation ¼ .57; MA: a ¼ .85, mean itemtotal correlation ¼ .63) and in the clinical sample (SA: a ¼ .88, mean item-total correlation ¼ .57; MA: a ¼ .86, mean item-total correlation ¼ .65). Test-retest reliability of the SAM subscales was examined using 43 OCD patients over an average of a 10.8 week interval. Both scales were stable over the interval (SA, r ¼ .44, po.001; MA, r ¼ .57, po.001). Convergent validity of SAM subscales was demonstrated by high correlations in the student control cohort between the subscales and various measures of self-evaluation. The SAM subscales correlated significantly with a 12 item self-report measure of self-uncertainty (Self-Concept Clarity Scale (Campbell et al., 1996) , r SA ¼ .82, po.001; r MA ¼ .53, po.001), an 8 item measure of the tendency to make dichotomous appraisals of self (Self-splitting subscale of the Splitting Index (Gould et al., 1996) ; r SA ¼ .78, po.001; r MA ¼ .42, po.001) and a 12 item measure of rumination about one's characteristics (Rumination subscale of the Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999 ) r SA ¼ .67, po.001; r MA ¼ .35, po.001).
Statistical analyses
First, zero order correlations were conducted to examine the hypothesis that high scores on measures of selfambivalence would be associated with high scores on measures of OCD phenomena and OCD-relevant belief domains. Prior to computing correlation coefficients, various assumptions underlying the analyses were examined. Second, multiple hierarchical regressions were conducted to examine if these relationships remained significant after controlling for the effects of negative mood states (anxiety, depression) and self-esteem. Finally, multiple analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were performed to test the hypothesis that patients with OCD would report higher levels of self-ambivalence than non-clinical controls. These analyses also investigated whether self-ambivalence was significantly higher in the OCD group compared to the anxious control group.
Results
Correlational analyses
Zero order correlations were employed to examine linear relationships between SAM subscales, PI and the OBQ-44 subscales. As initial correlational analyses using separate data sets from the non-clinical and clinical samples indicated a similar pattern of results, the samples were combined for purposes of parsimony. Further, given that non-normal distributions and multivariate outliers can artificially deflate or inflate the correlation coefficient, the data were inspected for normality and outliers. Inspection of scatter-plots of relationships between the measures showed no obvious multivariate outliers. Four variables (PI, MA, responsibility and importance of thoughts) were positively skewed while RSE was negatively skewed. However, as transforming these variables did not alter the significance of correlation coefficients, the variables were left untransformed. All zero order correlations between SAM subscales, PI and OBQ-44 subscales were significant at po.001 (Table 2) .
Regression analyses
Hierarchical regression analyses were conducted using the combined sample to examine whether SAM subscales predicted PI and the OBQ-44 subscales while controlling for self-esteem, depressed mood state and anxiety. The dependent variables were PI, responsibility, perfectionism and importance of thoughts. The BDI, BAI and RSE were simultaneously entered in step 1 as a block, followed in step 2 by MA or SA. Tolerance values were within acceptable limits, indicating that multicollinearity was not a problem. Results showed that both subscales of SAM significantly predicted PI and each OBQ-44 subscale, after controlling for self-esteem, depression and anxiety (see Table 3 ).
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Analyses of variance
Multiple ANOVAs were conducted to compare levels of self-ambivalence across the cohorts (Table 4) . Because two student control participants had standard scores beyond 3.00 on a SAM subscale, they were excluded from the analyses. Variables were normally distributed in each sample, and variances across samples for each variable were sufficiently homogenous (Howell, 1997) . Gender was not controlled as a covariate as no gender differences were detected when combining samples for either SA (males: n ¼ 106, mean ¼ 23.80, SD ¼ 11.17; females: n ¼ 243, mean ¼ 23.81, SD ¼ 11.25; t (347) ¼ .01, p ¼ .995) or MA (males: n ¼ 106, mean ¼ 5.86, SD ¼ 4.98; females: n ¼ 240, mean ¼ 5.57, SD ¼ 4.68; t (344) ¼ .52, p ¼ .606). One way ANOVAs showed significant group differences on SA, F (3, 351) ¼ 25.99, po.001, Z 2 p ¼ :23, and MA, F (3, 348) ¼ 17.46, po.001, Z 2 p ¼ :13. Post hoc Student-Newman-Keuls (SNK) tests showed that the OCD and anxious control groups scored significantly higher than the non-clinical groups. However, OCD and anxious control samples did not differ from each other on either SAM subscale.
Discussion
This study investigated the relationship of self-ambivalence to OCD phenomena and OCD-relevant dysfunctional beliefs, and the extent to which these relationships were mediated by depression, anxiety and self-esteem. Further, it explored if patients with OCD were more ambivalent about their self-worth and morality compared to non-clinical individuals and patients with other anxiety disorders. As hypothesized, selfambivalence was positively associated with the severity of OCD phenomena and with OCD-relevant dysfunctional beliefs. Further, these relationships remained significant when controlling for self-esteem and negative mood states. As hypothesized, individuals with OCD were more self-ambivalent than non-clinical participants. However, individuals with OCD did not report significantly more self-ambivalence than individuals diagnosed with other anxiety disorders. These findings are discussed in greater detail below.
First, self-ambivalence was associated with OCD severity and OCD-relevant beliefs. Self-ambivalence was operationalized in this study as a state of uncertainty and preoccupation about conflicting beliefs about one's moral virtues and about one's self-worth in general. Individuals with OCD scored significantly higher than non-clinical individuals on both indices of self-ambivalence. These findings are generally consistent with Table 3 Hierarchical regressions examining the association of self-ambivalence with OCD phenomena and OCD-relevant beliefs controlling for negative mood states and self-esteem
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Step 1 Step 2 Note: Depression, anxiety and self-esteem were entered as a block in step 1. In step 2, SA or MA was entered as the predictor (df ¼ 1. 240). DV, dependent variable; SA, self-worth ambivalence subscale of the Self-Ambivalence Measure (SAM); MA, moral ambivalence subscale of SAM; PI, Padua Inventory Revised Total Score; R, Responsibility scale of the Obsessional Beliefs Questionnaire-44 (OBQ-44); P, Perfectionism scale of the OBQ-44; IO, importance of thoughts scale of the OBQ-44.
research showing that OCD is related to self-insecurity (Doron et al., in press ), self-uncertainty (Ruegg, 1994) , and to doubts about personal morality (Ferrier & Brewin, 2005) . Second, the association of self-ambivalence to OCD phenomena and OCD-relevant belief domains remained significant even when controlling for self-esteem, depression and anxiety. Past research has found that individuals are less clear about their personal attributes and self-worth when in states of low self-esteem, high depression or high anxiety (Campbell & Lavallee, 1993; Campbell et al., 1996; Donahue, Robins, Roberts, & John, 1993; Gould et al., 1996) . Therefore, by controlling for these factors, this study shows that self-ambivalence relates to OCD phenomena and belief domains irrespective of the level of these variables. This study extends previous research that has not controlled statistically for these factors (e.g., Ruegg, 1994) .
Third, this study found that self-ambivalence was not specific to OCD. No differences were found between the OCD group and anxious controls on either subscale of SAM. The lack of differences in selfambivalence between the OCD cohort and anxious controls may have been the result of a sampling issue. In this study, the OCD and anxious cohorts reported similar levels of OCD-relevant beliefs, unlike other studies which have found that OCD patients have significantly higher levels of these beliefs than anxious controls (Obsessive-Compulsive Cognitions Working Group, 2003 . Thus, replication with other anxious samples is warranted in order to examine whether cohorts that differ on belief domains also show differences in terms of self-ambivalence. Nevertheless, our finding is consistent with the view that fragility in selfconcept is relevant to a range of anxiety disorders (Clark & Wells, 1995; March, 1990) . On the basis of the current findings, self-ambivalence may at most be characterized as relevant to, rather than specific to, OCD.
The results of this study are consistent with Guidano and Liotti's (1983) view that individuals who are ambivalent about their own self-worth and moral qualities are prone to obsessional behaviours and beliefs. Guidano and Liotti conceptualize compulsions, perfectionism and other belief domains associated with OCD as defensive strategies for protecting positive internal representations of self. However, until this study, their conjectures have not had any evidential base. Even though this study does not test the causal relations implicated in Guidano and Liotti's theory, it constitutes a first step towards supporting a relationship between OCD phenomena and OCD relevant belief domains on the one hand, and self-ambivalence on the other. Such speculations, however, need to be examined empirically using modelling, experimental and longitudinal research methods. Cognitive theorists (e.g., Purdon & Clark, 2002; Rachman, 1998) have suggested that OCD patients exaggerate the importance of certain dystonic intrusions because the thoughts are regarded as evidence of undesirable personal characteristics. This study qualifies these suggestions by proposing that the extent to which one perceives such thoughts as threats to one's self-representation may depend on whether or not one is secure about one's self-definition in the first place. Individuals who are secure about their identity and selfworth are likely to discount negative intrusive thoughts as irrelevant to their character (i.e., they would know that they are not homicidal or careless, and therefore would be more likely to disregard such ego-dystonic intrusions). In support of this qualification, this study found that beliefs about the importance of thoughts were strongly and positively related to the self-ambivalence. This finding might explain why OCD usually begins in adolescence or early adulthood (Rasmussen & Tsuang, 1986) . It is during this phase of development that individuals are said to be most uncertain about who they are, and to be most interested in how they appear to others, their personal characteristics, morality and their status within a social community (Muus, 1996) .
There are limitations to the current study that future research may address. Causal postulations made in this study have not been directly tested. The associations between self-ambivalence and OCD may be reciprocal rather than directional. Further studies can investigate whether, and the mechanisms by which, changes in self-ambivalence lead to changes in OCD phenomena. If self-ambivalence is a mechanism of change, then researchers can examine those factors within treatment that can effectively reduce selfambivalence.
Second, research should also investigate the relevance of self-ambivalence for various subtypes and symptom profiles of OCD. Researchers have suggested that different OCD subtypes may reflect different motivational strivings (Bhar & Kyrios, 2005; McKay et al., 2004; e.g., Summerfeldt, Richter, Antony, & Swinson, 1999) . Self-ambivalence may relate better to OCD compulsions that are purportedly focussed on resolving doubts about one's moral character (e.g., praying rituals) and preventing harm to others (e.g., checking compulsions), than to compulsions that may be more motivated by disgust reactions (e.g., washing compulsions) and the need for symmetry (e.g., arranging compulsions).
Third, research can also be conducted to further assess ambivalent beliefs about various aspects of self. The SAM failed to discriminate between ambivalence about self-worth in general from ambivalence about one's lovability. Similar to other studies that have found a lack of statistical discrimination between social and global self-esteem (Coopersmith, 1986; Marsh & Hattie, 1996) , this study found that ambivalence about these domains was poorly discriminated. Therefore, this study was not able to examine the relationship between ambivalence about lovability per se and OCD. Idiographic of alternative assessment methods may be employed to examine ambivalence about various views of self, including perceptions of one's lovability.
In summary, this study represents the first empirical investigation of self-ambivalence in OCD. In support of Guidano and Liotti's (1983) model of OCD, it found that self-ambivalence was strongly associated with phenomena and beliefs of OCD even when controlling for potential mediators such as selfesteem, depressed mood and anxiety. Individuals with OCD showed higher levels of self-ambivalence than non-clinical individuals, but no difference was found between the OCD group and anxious controls. Collectively, these findings are consistent with the possibility that self-ambivalence functions as a non-specific vulnerability or maintaining factor for OCD. Further research is required to examine such causal postulation, but this study provides a basis for extending the cognitive-behavioural model of OCD to include ambivalent self-perceptions as a component of the cognitive mechanisms relevant to the disorder.
Appendix
Promax rotated principal factor loadings for 21 SAM items in non-clinical and clinical samples as shown in Table A1 . Note: Factor loadings X30 appear in bold. Items 13 and 21 were not included in either subscale of the Self Ambivalence Measure (SAM).
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